**Economy**

**Contention one is the economy**

**Low exports are crushing growth and causing prolific debt**

**Barlow 12** – staff writer for economyincrisis.org, online news source about the US economy (George, “The Perils of Importing More than We Export,” economyincrisis.org, May 25 2012, http://economyincrisis.org/content/perils-importing-more-we-export ) //JG

 The United States continues to import more, and export less each year, while our production levels drop and we continue the sell off our large companies to foreign interests. As a result, tax revenue has receded and we now have fewer American owned companies remaining to produce wealth and generate taxes. Our government, already drowned in foreign debt, must continuously borrow more to operate and pay its bills. This cycle of debt enlargement has impacted every level of our economy. Government debt is now more than $14 trillion. The 2007 balance of trade deficit (debt) was $731 billion, while China made a $371 billion profit during the same year. In 2009, the trade deficit was $506.9 billion, an improvement, but still completely unacceptable. The following figures represent the balance of trade deficits per year from 2000-2009. It is through these means that foreign interests buy us out. 2000 – $446.2 = $848,997 per minute 2001 – $421.9 = $802,854 per minute 2002 – $475.3 = $904,385 per minute 2003 – $541.5 = $1,030,335 per minute 2004 – $665.6 = $1,266,421 per minute 2005 – $783.8 = $1,491,250 per minute 2006 – $839.4 = $1,597,139 per minute 2007 – $823.1 = $1,566,195 per minute 2008 – $834.6 = $1,587,998 per minute 2009 – $506.9 = $964,505 per minute This is a grand total of $6.3 trillion in trade debt in just a short 10 year time span – money that can only come back to buy us out! It is prudent to note that the difference between imports and exports in 2009 and 2008 is due to a drop in all economic activity, not because of a substantial increase in exports relative to imports. No country can continue to exist on debt, especially when there is very little probability of ever repaying it. How can we continue to delude ourselves with the idea that we are a superpower? Our standard of living and economic strength is dependent on ever increasing imports and our entire economy can only be temporarily sustained by ever increasing debts. As we witnessed briefly in 2008, our bubble will burst, and when it happens again the crash of 2008 will appear to have occurred in a time of prosperity. Our lenders will inevitably discontinue loaning us any more money. What motivation could they have to continue? Our productive capabilities have become uncompetitive and insufficient. Our manufacturing infrastructure and our source of a competent manufacturing labor force has been dissolved and replaced overseas. How will we possibly function when the money runs out? Something needs to be done, and it needs to be done soon. The process will be difficult, but the negative consequences of the alternative (continuing on our current path) pales in comparison.

**Debt causes geopolitical tensions and economic collapse – now is key to avert crisis**

**Ture 13** – Ph.D. and Senior Fellow in the Economics of Fiscal Policy at the Heritage Foundation (JD,

The Many Real Dangers of Soaring National Debt,” The Heritage Foundation, June 18 2013, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/the-many-real-dangers-of-soaring-national-debt ) //JG

The U.S. economy is recovering from the Great Global Recession, but President Obama’s massive deficits, soaring debt, and tepid support for reforms to render America’s entitlement programs affordable pose a grave economic threat. The threat is not theoretical; it is not suppositional. The threat is real and must be faced squarely, and soon. The simple fact is that under current policy, “America is on the verge of becoming a country in decline—economically stagnant and permanently debt-bound.”[24] Economic forecasts beyond the next few quarters, whether by government or private forecasters, tend to show the economy moving toward normal levels of production and employment over some reasonable period, with interest rates likewise returning to normal levels. However, recent history both in the U.S. and abroad underscores how quickly events can turn when market psychology is upended. Rather than increasing steadily, interest rates are more likely to surge in stages, hammering the economy anew each time.Nor is the future likely to unfold undisturbed. In addition to geopolitical tensions, Europe has yet to resolve its internal monetary contradictions surrounding the euro. While European leaders have masterfully danced from crisis to crisis, they have yet to settle on policies rendering the euro a viable currency or their economies strong, viable competitors internationally. At home, perhaps the Federal Reserve has badly misjudged as it aggressively pursues its policy of quantitative easing through “extraordinary measures” and will have to raise interest rates quickly to prevent inflation. Or perhaps the recent extended period of high unemployment has degraded worker skills in ways only now implied, or perhaps business investment in new facilities or research and development has been inadequate to sustain normal growth rates. The point is not that any or all of these possibilities are likely, but that they and others may transpire, and thanks to the rapid increase in U.S. government debt, the federal government is poorly positioned to respond and the U.S. economy is poorly positioned to overcome their effects. The current period of low interest rates despite rising debt is beguiling policymakers and the nation alike about the risks stemming from America’s irresponsible fiscal policy, lulling them into complacency. Not merely the calm before the storm, economic conditions brought about by developments abroad and monetary policy at home have effectively anesthetized financial markets against the effects of U.S. fiscal profligacy. The anesthesia, however, will prove temporary. Interest rates will almost certainly rise past the normal levels now forecast, the economy will suffer—all largely due to the budget deficits now being incurred and to the inaction so far to address the even greater, entitlement-driven deficits in the years immediately ahead. America’s decline is far from inevitable. There is still time for a substantial and effective course correction. Congress, working with President Obama, can begin to right the ship quickly with six well-vetted, bipartisan proposals, starting the process of reforming Social Security and Medicare so they better serve their constituencies today while remaining affordable tomorrow.[25] Enacting all six proposals, however, would still leave the task only partly completed. To finish the job, Congress and the President will need a more comprehensive approach, such as is laid out in The Heritage Foundation’s Saving the American Dream plan.[26] There is still time, but not much, to ensure America’s prosperity for the next generation.

**Economic decline causes nuclear war**

**Harris and Burrows, 9** – \*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, \*\*member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.

The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

**Alternatives to growth kill hundreds of millions and cause global conflict – we can’t “turn off” the economy**

**Barnhizer 6** — David R. Barnhizer, Emeritus Professor at Cleveland State University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, 2006 (“Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking Realities of Business and Government,” *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* (18 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 595), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

**The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off at all, and certainly not abruptly. It cannot even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty, and strife. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts** and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities. n60. **The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but also to people living in nations that are currently economically underdeveloped. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, and economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this; we cannot return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior**

**US-Mexican trade is high and inevitable but the plan is key to export oriented growth**

**Wilson 13 -** Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Christopher, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations, May 2013 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_new\_era.pdf )

After years of slow growth (4.5 percent average annual growth from 2000-2008) and then a 17 percent drop between 2008 and 2009 during the Great Recession, U.S.-Mexico trade is now booming as never before. It is growing faster than U.S. trade with China and faster than the post-NAFTA spurt in the 1990s.7 In the uncertain context of a global economy in search of a new equilibrium—Europe struggling, China’s decelerating, a fiscal reckoning in the United States—the bilateral economic relationship stands out as a pillar of strength and perhaps a signpost on the path to a stronger economic region. ¶ U.S.-Mexico trade already supports more than six million U.S. jobs, and the return of manufacturing competitiveness to the region, as well as the robust growth of the Mexican economy, presents an opportunity to significantly increase export-supported employment should steps be taken to bring about further advances in North American competitiveness.8 The extraordinary thing is that this recent boom in bilateral trade has occurred without a strategy. Imagine what could be achieved if the governments of the United States and Mexico—ideally in conjunction with Canada—designed and implemented a comprehensive plan to improve the competitiveness of our region in the global marketplace.

**Joint negotiations in the TPP turns North America into a manufacturing destination and export platform for global economic expansion**

**Gerwin 13** - Senior Fellow for Trade and Global Economic Policy for the Third Way Economic Program (Ed, “Rooting for Canada and Mexico in the TPP,” Third Way, March 2013, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/672/Third\_Way\_Policy\_Memo\_-\_Rooting\_for\_Canada\_and\_Mexico\_in\_the\_TPP\_.pdf ) //JG

Working together in the TPP could help the United States, Canada, and Mexico further build on this success, supporting increased trade and good jobs for America’s producers and workers.7 We highlight below four reasons why expanded teamwork with our closest neighbors in the TPP could be good for the United States.¶ 1) Launching Pads for American Exports**.** When our neighbors in Canada and Mexico make things, they frequently use a high percentage of inputs that are “Made in the USA.”8 One study, for example, estimates that 40% of the content of Mexico’s exports to the United States is originally from America. Similarly, Canada’s U.S.-bound exports are an estimated 25% U.S. content. By contrast, other countries tend to use much less American content. Only 4% of the content of China’s exports to the United States, for example, is American.9 Because Canadian and Mexican products often contain such high levels of U.S. content, America wins when Canada and Mexico boost their exports to the rest of the world.11 The TPP would enhance the ability of Canada and Mexico to act as global export platforms for more American content in two important ways. First, the TPP would open major new markets for exports from Canada and Mexico, especially in East Asia. Canada, for example, currently has no free trade deals in the East Asian region. The TPP would open up six significant countries in the region to Canadian exports (and American content), including Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.12 Second, under the TPP, more exports from Canada and Mexico would qualify for preferred access to foreign markets. Mexico, for instance, already has an extensive roster of free trade agreements, but its exports often don’t qualify for tariff preferences under these non-U.S. deals because they contain so much U.S. content. American content would count under TPP origin rules, enabling Mexico (and Canada) to sell more of their products (with more U.S. content) to our TPP partners.¶2) Greasing the Skids for Regional Trade**.** Canada, Mexico, and the United States don’t just make things–they make things together. NAFTA enables our countries to use highly integrated supply chains to co-produce–and sell to the world–an astonishing array of “Made in North America” products, from cars and cookies, to engines and electronics, and pasta and planes.15 North America’s shared production is deep and extensive. Cars co-produced by Canada and the United States, for example, contain parts and subassemblies that have crossed the border an average of six times. One-third of all U.S.-Canada trade is intra-company trade–Ford selling to Ford or GE selling to GE.16 And over 40% of U.S.-Mexico trade is between companies in the same industry. But the flow of North American commerce is hardly seamless. Even under NAFTA, border barriers18 and regulatory differences19 still cause serious “chokepoints” that raise the cost and reduce the efficiency of trade in the region. And the highly integrated nature of North America’s economy only magnifies the negative impacts of these chokepoints. For instance, frequent border crossings impose an estimated $700 per vehicle penalty on the integrated co-production of cars in North America. Cross-border Meltdowns Indiana-based Hoosier Gasket had a searing experience with border barriers–when summer heat and long border delays combined to warp an entire shipment of gaskets destined for manufacturers in Mexico.21 Because of different food rules, General Mills runs separate production lines for Cheerios sold in Canada and the United States, and Campbell’s sells soup in different-sized cans in the two markets.222 In recent years, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have significantly boosted joint efforts to reduce border and regulatory barriers.23 The United States and Canada, for example, are pursuing 29 initiatives that would eliminate unnecessary differences in rules and ensure that regulators are on the same page as they develop new standards in areas like nanotechnology.24 This shared experience makes Canada and Mexico natural partners with the United States in negotiations to facilitate the flow of trade among the TPP’s eleven partner countries–economies that have a combined GDP of almost $21 trillion. And the TPP’s strong emphasis on “holistic” approaches to efficient supply chains will not only help expedite trade at our common borders, but will better link North America’s integrated economies to business opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region.¶3) “Re-shoring” ProductionAs wages and costs in countries like China continue to rise, businesses are looking at a broad matrix of factors in deciding where to locate or re-locate production**. These factors include transport and energy costs, proximity to markets and suppliers, skilled workers, legal enforcement, supply chain efficiency, and infrastructure.26 When judged on this broader basis, “**re-shoring” to America makes increasing economic sense–both for producers and for the overall U.S. economy**.27** Co-producing products **in the United States, Canada, and Mexico** can be a particularly effective “re-shoring” strategy–one that takes advantage of our region’s overall competitive advantages, while strongly supporting U.S. production and jobs**.** U.S. and international companies, for example, increasingly see Mexico–with its skilled workforce, improving infrastructure, and relatively higher levels of legal protection–as a better long-term alternative than China for locating production facilities.**28 And,** because of Mexico’s proximity and close integration with U.S. supply chains, more production in Mexico creates greater opportunities for U.S based suppliers of parts and components and their U.S. workers**.29** Cooperating with Canada and Mexico through the TPP could help to reinforce these important trends**. The TPP’s emphasis on trade facilitation** would make North American supply chains more efficient and make North America a more desirable location for production**. At the same time, the TPP would open growing, new Asian markets to an array of North American-made products. And, with the addition of Canada and Mexico,** it would be easier to develop strong TPP origin rules that would promote production and jobs in North America**.30 Driving North American North America’s growing, integrated auto sector is increasingly exporting to the world–shipping Jeeps from Ohio and Toyotas from Indiana. Honda recently announced that it is poised to become a net exporter from North America, as its U.S., Canadian, and Mexican plants increasingly sell globally. New trade deals like the TPP can help drive this trend. After the United States concluded its recent trade deal with South Korea, for instance, companies including Ford, Honda, and Toyota ramped up exports of U.S.-built cars to Korea.31** ¶4) A Facelift for NAFTA**.** Negotiating in the TPP with Canada and Mexico also allows the United States to address nettlesome trade issues that still exist under NAFTA. These include: ¶ • Canadian “supply management” **rules that severely limit the ability of U.S. farmers to export dairy, chicken, eggs, and turkey to Canada;** ¶ **• Barriers caused by Canada’s intellectual property (IP) laws and IP enforcement, as well as its local content quotas for Canadian TV and radio; and32** ¶ **• Mexico’s failures to protect and enforce certain U.S. IP, its limits on telecom access and foreign investment, and its anticompetitive business practices.33** ¶The TPP talks also offer the opportunity to upgrade NAFTA’s side agreements on labor and the environment by adopting strong and enforceable labor and environment rules**, such as those included in the U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement.34** Raising these and other issues in the context of the TPP talks could provide new avenues–and potential new allies and possible new trade-offs–to help the United States to tackle difficult trade issues **with Canada and Mexico.** Progress on these fronts could further boost U.S. exports to our neighbors and advance global adoption of high-standard trade rules.¶Conclusion¶ In the past, it was often easy to measure the benefits of trade. Producers and workers in Country A would make a finished product from local inputs and export it to Country B. In today’s global economy, however, trade is much more complex. Exports like cars, electronics, processed foods, and financial services are frequently co-produced in multiple countries and can contain extensive “embedded” content from producers around the world.35¶ It’s vital to keep this modern reality in mind when evaluating the importance to the United States of Canada’s and Mexico’s participation in the TPP. Because of their proximity and extensive integration in regional supply chains, when Canada and Mexico succeed in global markets, America often wins too. ¶Our three countries are also integrated by two decades of common experience under NAFTA and shared political and commercial values.36 And working together, the United States, Canada, and Mexico could create momentum for further expanding the TPP–and advancing our shared desire to extend strong and fair trade rules throughout the broader Asia-Pacific region.37¶ For these reasons–and many others–it’s good for the United States to have our North American neighbors as negotiating partners in the TPP.

**Joint economic engagement with Mexico in TPP negotiations makes the North American market desirable to Asia – that’s key to effective Asia pivot**

**Shapiro 13 -** President of the Institute of the Americas a public policy think tank at UCSD (Charles, "Time to shift focus in relations with Mexico," San Diego Union Tribune, 2/6/13, web.utsandiego.com/news/2013/Feb/06/mexico-trade-economy/?#article-copy ) //JG

Nearly 20 years after the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexico and Canada have joined the United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an ambitious trade negotiation with eight other Pacific Rim countries. The inclusion of our closest trading partners in the Western Hemisphere ensures that the deal is truly trans-Pacific, rather than one focused primarily on Asia. While Washington focuses on a “pivot” to Asia, rebalancing our global priorities will prove incomplete without a renewed commitment to our North American neighbors. ¶ The Mexican and Canadian economies are not only our largest export markets, but also joint production platforms. We build goods together, and we must do more to advance cross-border trade. ¶ Our relationship with Mexico presents intriguing possibilities with the new administration of President Peña Nieto. A bold vision for our bilateral relationship should capitalize on Mexico’s growing economic dynamism and diplomatic heft. ¶ Latin America’s second-largest economy, Mexico is outpacing Brazil through export-led growth and sound macroeconomic management. It is one of the most open of the world’s leading economies, with a network of 44 free-trade agreements, while Mexico’s economy has moved increasingly to high-tech operations. ¶ Reasons to be optimistic about Mexico’s economy include domestic momentum for reform and diminished competition from China. Rising wages and higher transport costs make Chinese exports more expensive, playing to Mexico’s geographic advantage as companies seek to cut costs through near sourcing. Mexico is tackling needed reforms, beginning with passage of a new labor law and education reform. Cooperation between Mexico’s major political parties bodes well for an opening of Mexico’s heavily protected oil industry, a potentially huge boost for North American growth. ¶ It is time for U.S. political leaders to recognize what our private sector already understands: the importance of Mexico to U.S. prosperity. ¶ Unfortunately, when the U.S. looks south, we tend to focus on the security and violence. We applaud the unprecedented bilateral cooperation in the fight against transnational organized crime, and we have advocated for U.S. security assistance to Mexico in that effort. It is time to shift to a greater focus on economic and geopolitical opportunities. ¶ A joint competitiveness agenda should begin with making business easier at our common border. Important security gains have been achieved, but trade facilitation has received insufficient attention, despite the steady integration of cross-border supply chains. Long and unpredictable crossing times mean bottlenecks at the border, and relatively few ports of entry have seen major upgrades. Infrastructure investment and expansion of pre-clearance programs will require intense bilateral cooperation and consultation with the private sector in both nations. ¶ More broadly, we must harness the strategic power of our inextricable economic links. As a stalwart free-trade advocate and a member of the G-20, Mexico is well positioned to be a significant player in global financial and economic coordination. It is also a responsible international actor with which the U.S. shares commercial interests and political values. ¶ More sophisticated and effective engagement with Mexico would see our governments acting as partners in multilateral settings. Mexico’s inclusion in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations was a critical step, offering a vehicle to update our trade relationship to the standards of the 21st century and to explore new markets for jointly produced goods. Like the United States, Mexico is interested in deepening its economic relations with Asia, so why not pivot together? As China and the United States vie for economic influence, Mexico’s participation in TPP advances a vision that spans the Pacific to link the Americas and Asia – in contrast to China’s preferences for regional agreements that exclude the Western Hemisphere.¶ We should champion North American integration in other multilateral contexts. For example, as trans-Atlantic momentum builds for a free-trade agreement between the United States and the European Union, we should consider the possibility of negotiating as a North American bloc.¶Such initiatives will depend upon leadership from both the White House and the Congress as well as a broader shift in how Americans view our southern neighbor.This period of political transition and economic promise presents a unique opportunity to forge ahead.

**Specifically, reduced US protectionism toward Mexico is key to Asia pivot**

**Barfield ’13** – former consultant to the office of the US Trade Representative and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (Claude, “Mexican tomatoes and the US TPP negotiations,” East Asia Forum: Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific, 3/14/13, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/14/mexican-tomatoes-and-the-us-tpp-negotiations/)//ER

With the presidential election out of the way, there was hope that the president’s trade team would reveal a braver face on trade policy. Alas, in January the administration delivered a backhanded, protectionist slap to its NAFTA and TPP partner, Mexico. As anyone who has suffered through rock-hard, unripe Florida winter tomatoes knows full well, the arrival over the past decade of riper, juicier Mexican winter tomatoes has been a godsend. When the Obama administration signalled last year that it would go along with Florida tomato growers’ demands for more protection, the thought was that it was bowing to election pressure. Well, Barack Obama won decisively. But a few weeks ago the government mandated a steep price rise for Mexican tomatoes and cut the amount of the fruit that could be imported — one can only assume out of conviction that US producers must be protected no matter the cost or quality considerations for the consumer.¶ If this craven attitude and stance prevails in the TPP negotiations, they will surely fail. This would be a double blow to the US and the world trading systems. First, on most of the 21st-century TPP issues, the president and his team are spot on — these are the central issues to ensure more open future markets. Beyond economics, however, TPP failure would be disastrous for US strategic leadership in East Asia where the regional pact has become the central symbol of the US ‘pivot’ and rebalancing.¶ In coming months, it will be imperative for President Obama to use his hard-won political capital to challenge entrenched protectionist interest groups and policies. After all, on his own word a central element of his legacy is wrapped up in getting the TPP over the finish line. More parochially, during these grey days of February it would be a boon to enjoy an edible Mexican tomato again.

**US focus on Asia pivot is key to solve multiple hotspots from escalating to nuclear war**

**Colby 11** – Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, August 10, 2011, “Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire,” The Diplomat, online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-empire/2/?print=yes

But the pendulum shouldn’t be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment. For our problem hasn’t been overseas commitments and interventions as such, but the kinds of interventions. The US alliance and partnership structure, what the late William Odom called the United States’ ‘liberal empire’ that includes a substantial military presence and a willingness to use it in the defence of US and allied interests, remains a vital component of US security and global stability and prosperity. This system of voluntary and consensual cooperation under US leadership, particularly in the security realm, constitutes a formidable bloc defending the liberal international order.¶ But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this system is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to become the centre of the global economy.¶ A nuclear North Korea’s violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, as well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyang’s development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover, brings into sight the day when North Korea could threaten the United States itself with nuclear attack, a prospect that will further imperil stability in the region.¶ More broadly, the rise of China – and especially its rapid and opaque military build-up – combined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes is troubling to the United States and its allies and partners across the region. Particularly relevant to the US military presence in the western Pacific is the development of Beijing’s anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets.¶ While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities will give China the growing power to deny the United States the ability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to undermine the US-guaranteed security substructure that has defined littoral East Asia since World War II. Even if China says today it won’t exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring?¶ Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must be coupled with efforts to engage Beijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. ¶ In short, the United States must increase its involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply maintaining the military balance in the western Pacific will, however, involve **substantial investments** to improve US capabilities. It will also require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under the US security umbrella. This won’t be cheap, for these requirements can’t be met simply by incremental additions to the existing posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech capabilities.¶ Yet such efforts are vital, for East Asia represents the economic future, and its strategic developments will determine which country or countries set the international rules that shape that economic future. Conversely, US interventions in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in south-eastern Europe have been driven by far more ambitious and aspirational conceptions of the national interest, encompassing the proposition that failing or **illiberally governed peripheral states** can contribute to an instability that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true, the effort is rightly seen by the new political tide **not** to be **worth the benefits gained**. Moreover, the United States can scale (and has scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests in ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism.¶ The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that the United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather that we must be more discriminating in making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure, leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be counted on to look out for US interests.¶ We need to focus on making the right interventions, not forswearing them completely. In practice, this means a more substantial focus on East Asia and the serious security challenges there, and less emphasis on the Middle East. ¶ This isn’t to say that the United States should be unwilling to intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there should be more tightly connected to concrete objectives such as protecting the free flow of oil from the region, preventing terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, and forestalling or, if necessary, containing **nuclear prolif**eration **as opposed to the more idealistic aspirations to transform the region’s societies.** ¶ **These more concrete objectives** can be better met by the more judicious and economical use of our military power. More broadly, however, it means a shift in US emphasis away from the greater Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific region, which dwarfs the former in economic and military potential and in the dynamism of its societies. The Asia-Pacific region, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the global stage, is where the future of the international security and economic system will be set, and it is there that Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of rising regional security challenges. ¶ In light of US budgetary pressures, including the hundreds of billions in ‘security’ related money to be cut as part of the debt ceiling deal, it’s doubly important that US security dollars be allocated to the most pressing tasks – shoring up the US position in the most important region of the world, the **Asia**-Pacific. It will also **require restraint** in expenditure on those challenges and regions that don’t touch so directly on the future of US security and prosperity. ¶ As Americans debate the proper US global role in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and Iraq and Afghanistan, they would do well to direct their ire not at overseas commitments and intervention as such, but rather at those not tied to core US interests and the sustainment and adaptation of the ‘liberal empire’ that we have constructed and maintained since World War II.¶ Defenders of our important overseas links and activities should clearly distinguish their cause from the hyperactive and barely restrained approach represented by those who, unsatisfied with seeing the United States tied down in three Middle Eastern countries, seek intervention in yet more, such as Syria. Indeed, those who refuse to scale back US interventions in the Middle East or call for still more are directly contributing to the weakening of US commitments in East Asia, given strategic developments in the region and a sharply constrained budgetary environment in Washington.¶ We can no longer afford, either strategically or financially, to squander our power in unnecessary and ill-advised interventions and nation-building efforts. The ability and will to intervene is too important to be so wasted.

**Specifically, Asia pivot prevents North Korean crisis and nuclear war**

**Hiatt ’13** – editorial page editor of The Washington Post (Fred, “Asian tensions add urgency to Obama’s ‘pivot’,” Washington Post, 2/10/13, [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-10/opinions/37026174\_1\_kim-jong-eun-diaoyu-islands-young-leader)//ER](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-10/opinions/37026174_1_kim-jong-eun-diaoyu-islands-young-leader%29//ER)

In Asia, things could get really scary.¶ Since he entered the White House, Obama has wanted to shift attention and resources to the Pacific. The biggest opportunities are there: economic growth, innovation, potential for cross-border investment and trade. That the 21st century will be a Pacific century has become a cliche.¶ The cliche may still prove out. But rather suddenly, the region of economic miracles has become a zone of frightening confrontation. The North Koreans are turning out videos depicting New York in flames. Chinese warships have fixed their weapon-targeting radar on a Japanese ship and helicopter. Quarrels have intensified between South Korea and Japan, North Korea and South Korea, China and the Philippines, India and China. Taiwan is always a possible flashpoint. Any one of these could drag the United States in. ¶ The scariest development may be in North Korea, the world’s only hereditary prison camp, where the young leader — the third-generation Kim — seems determined to expand and improve his nuclear arsenal until he becomes a genuine threat not only to South Korea and Japan but to the United States as well. Chinese officials are said to be alarmed by his intransigence but unwilling to try to rein him in, fearing even more the instability that might result. Obama in his first term adopted a reasonable policy of ignoring North Korea as much as possible, while making clear that he would reciprocate if it became more accommodating. Kim Jong Eun, who is thought to be in his late 20s, could find ways to make that stance untenable.

**Goes nuclear.**

**Herald Sun ‘3** (“Threat of war at any moment”, 3-3, L/N)

North Korea said yesterday that nuclear war could break out on the Korean Peninsula at "any moment". The threat comes on the eve of military exercises between South Korea and the US. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun warned of a calamity unless the stand-off over Pyongyang's nuclear program is resolved peacefully and quickly. The North accused Washington of planning massive war games to prepare for an invasion, and said the country is "fully ready to repel the US military attack". North Korea will take "a self-defensive measure when it thinks that the US pre-emptive attack is imminent," it said. In Tokyo, Japanese deputy cabinet secretary Shinzo Abe said North Korea might test fire its long-range Taepodong ballistic missile toward the sea between Japan and the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's anti-American diatribes have escalated as Pyongyang faces international pressure to give up its suspected nuclear weapons programs. North Korea's east coast is dotted with guns and missile bases that US intelligence officials believe can launch ballistic missiles. The US and South Korea will hold two joint annual military exercises from tomorrow until April 2, and from March 19 to 26. "These unceasing US war drills drive the situation on the Korean Peninsula to such a dangerous pitch of tension that a nuclear war may break out on it any moment," the statement from the North said. Earlier, South Korean President Roh said he adamantly opposed North Korea's nuclear development, but said the issue must be resolved peacefully but urgently. "If peace on the Korean Peninsula collapses for whatever reason, it would bring about a tremendous calamity that we cannot cope with," he said.

# China

**Contention two is China**

**China chooses to forgo TPP negotiations now – incentives to join aren’t powerful enough**

**Solís 13** - senior fellow at the Brookings Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and associate professor at American University PhD in government and an MA in East Asian Studies from Harvard University, and a BA in international relations from El Colegio de México (Mireya, “The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP,” Brookings Institute, 5/24/13, [http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis)//AC](http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/05/24-china-transpacific-partnership-solis%29//AC)

In recent commentary for the Financial Times, David Pilling argues that the central objective of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations is the exclusion of China. In his view, the desire to build an “anyone but China” club is due both to the perception that China got an easy pass when it joined the WTO and has continued to flaunt international trade and investment rules; and to the articulation of a larger political strategy to marginalize this emerging superpower. Pilling goes on to predict that the TPP will fail to deliver major liberalization as the traditional pattern of shielding sensitive sectors will emerge, and admonishes that only a much diluted trade agreement faces a realistic chance of ratification given the fractured consensus on the new proposed rules. In this rendition, the TPP appears politically myopic and economically irrelevant**.** The argument that the TPP is a club that bars Chinese entry is inaccurate and unhelpful. China, like any other APEC economy, has the right to request entry into the TPP. Whether the Chinese leadership will judge TPP membership to be in their country’s national interest and whether TPP members can be persuaded that China is prepared to abide by the negotiated disciplines is a separate matter. But it is important to dispel the notion that the TPP precludes Chinese entry. In fact, this trade agreement scores better than most in incorporating an accession mechanism that has already delivered membership expansion from four to twelve members –now comprising 40% of world GDP. More fundamentally, it is hard to understand why TPP countries would pursue the counter-productive and unfeasible goal of marginalizing China. China sits at the apex of the world economy as it ranks number two in share of world GDP and is at the center of global supply chains. A trade agreement that by fiat sought to defy these fundamental economic realities would be foolhardy indeed. Hence the TPP concept is expansive: it aims to eventually develop an Asia-Pacific wide platform of economic integration, not to draw lines encircling China. If Chinese exclusion were the selling point of the TPP for countries like Japan, then one would be hard pressed to explain why the Japanese government is concurrently negotiating two major trade agreements with China: a trilateral FTA in Northeast Asia and an East Asian trade agreement known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). And the same is true for all other Asian countries in the TPP who already partake in the ASEAN-China FTA and are participating in the RCEP talks. The “us versus them” dynamic of security alliances is not really applicable to free trade agreements. The noodle bowl that characterizes the maze of FTAs illustrates the fact that in the world of international trade overlapping memberships render moot purely exclusive arrangements. Ascribing an anti-China objective to the TPP is not helpful on three main fronts: 1) it provides political cover to protectionist interests, who argue that they should not be asked to undertake painful economic adjustments for the sake of trade agreements driven by geopolitical concerns; 2) it sends a chilling message to prospective members, who may fear that in joining TPP they will be seen as enlisted in the anti-China camp; and 3) it will discourage China from finding points of convergence with the TPP agenda if this is seen as capitulating to an American strategy of containment. The most fundamental challenge to the TPP project vis-à-vis China is not that it is built around a faulty notion of containment, but rather that it may not constitute a powerful enough enticement to propel China to sign on to these new standards on trade and investment. China so far has reacted by accelerating its own trade initiatives in Asia. The risk that the United States and China will remain for the foreseeable future in separate trade groupings, without a significant bilateral dialogue on trade and investment, is very real. TPP negotiators cannot postpone the task of fashioning a strategy to engage China until after the TPP agreement is completed. They must be mindful of the fact that rules must be evaluated both in terms of their quality and dissemination potential. China must see in the new trade agenda a deal not unlike its accession to the WTO: while hefty commitments are to be expected, the accompanying domestic reforms will pay off handsomely in terms of improved economic performance.

**Joint TPP negotiations incentivize Chinese participation within the TPP to access the North American market**

**Wilson 13 -** Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Christopher, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” New Ideas for a New Era: Policy Options for the Next Stage in U.S.-Mexico Relations, May 2013 http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_new\_era.pdf ) //JG

The United States and Mexico are among the most open economies in the world, having integrated their manufacturing sectors through NAFTA and having negotiated trade agreements granting preferential access to a combined fifty-plus nations and two-thirds of global GDP. This presents a tremendous opportunity for the sale of jointly produced exports and cooperation on global trade issues to ensure North American products receive fair treatment around the world. Whether in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade agreement being negotiated by 11 Pacific Rim countries, or other initiatives, the United States, Mexico and Canada could improve their chances of successfully completing mutually beneficial trade deals by negotiating and working to implement them as a bloc, recognizing that each country shares in the advantages of a competitive North America. Though the TPP is the next step, it should be understood in the context of a broader strategy to drive progress on the global trade agenda. If the current parties successfully negotiate a comprehensive, 21st Century trade agreement linking the world’s largest economic region (North America) to its most dynamic (Asia-Pacific), China may decide it has more to gain by joining in than by sitting out, which would in turn create a strong incentive for longstalled progress at the World Trade Organization, strengthening the competitiveness of regional exports. A similarly continental approach might also be considered as the U.S. gets ready to begin negotiating a trade agreement with the European Union.

**Two impacts to TPP expansion – first is manufacturing**

**TPP liberalization is vital to US manufacturing**

**Meltzer 12** - fellow in Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution and an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies and at Georgetown Law School. Dr. Meltzer is also a reviewer for the Journal of Politics and Law. His work focuses on international trade law and policy issues relating to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Free Trade Agreements, S.J.D. and L.L.M from the University of Michigan Law School (Joshua, “The Significance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for the United States,” The Brookings Institution, 5/15/12, [http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2012/05/16-us-trade-strategy-meltzer)//AC](http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2012/05/16-us-trade-strategy-meltzer%29//AC)

The Impact of the Trans-Pacific Partnership on Small Businesses and the Manufacturing Sector

 The TPP should lead to increased opportunities for growth for American small business exporters. As a starting point, the TPP will increase U.S. GDP and exports, and these benefits will increase as more countries join. In fact, under a FTAAP, U.S. exports of manufactured goods are expected to increase by almost $120 billion and services exports are expected to increase by almost $200 billion.[6] The TPP’s impact on American small businesses and the U.S. manufacturing sector can also be inferred by looking at the impact of other free trade agreements. For example, under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)[7] and the U.S.- Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR),[8] the U.S. has a trade surplus in manufactured goods of $12 billion and $3 billion, respectively.[9] In addition, U.S. exports of manufactured goods to NAFTA and CAFTA-DR countries are growing faster than imports. These figures demonstrate that the U.S. manufacturing sector is world class and highly competitive, and in many sectors the U.S. already operates behind low tariff barriers. Moreover, **competition from abroad has also driven U.S. productivity gains and has enabled American manufacturers to source inputs from the lowest cost providers, further enhancing overall competitiveness. Further trade liberalization under the TPP is therefore likely to provide additional opportunities for the U.S. manufacturing sector overseas.** U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) also stand to gain from trade liberalization. In fact, almost 98 percent of all exporters and 97 percent of all importers are SMEs, representing almost 40 percent of U.S. goods exports and 31.5 percent of goods imports.[10] In addition, 94 percent of SMEs are exporters and importers. Therefore, trade agreements that liberalize trade barriers, like the TPP, should disproportionately benefit SMEs. In contrast with large businesses, SMEs generally benefit the most from government efforts to reduce trade barriers overseas as their capacity to overcome these barriers by establishing subsidiaries in other countries is much more limited. Setting the Trade and Investment Rules for the Asia-Pacific Region The economic gains to the U.S. from the current TPP members highlight the significance of the TPP as a template for further economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. As the TPP is an ongoing negotiation, the details of what is being proposed have not been released. However, we do know that the recent Korea-U.S. FTA will be a baseline and that USTR is seeking agreement on a range of new rules. For instance, in addition to including rules such as on goods and services, non-tariff barriers, investment and intellectual property, the United States is seeking to include new rules on regulatory coherence to reduce trade barriers arising from unnecessary regulatory diversity among TPP member countries. The U.S. is also seeking rules on state-owned enterprises in order to discipline the trade distorting impact that they can have when they do not operated according to competitive market-based principles. The TPP should also address the realities for American businesses that rely on supply chains located in different countries, often in the Asia-Pacific region.

Developing coherent rules of origin is one way of ensuring that the TPP reflects these business realities.

Progress on trade facilitation rules which reduce the costs of moving goods through customs is another important one. The TPP can also provide an important framework for the U.S. to promote rules that can protect the free flow of data across borders. The internet has become a key driver of trade, especially for SMEs, as companies have been able to use the internet to access customers overseas and at scale.[11] Getting these rules right is important as they will establish the framework for trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. A rules-based trading system backed by an effective dispute settlement mechanism, which **increases market access and the certainty and predictability of international trade and investment, will reduce risk and facilitate U.S. and global growth.** Deepening U.S. Economic Integration in Asia The TPP will also address the trend in the Asia-Pacific region toward regional economic integration that excludes the United States. For instance, ASEAN has free trade agreements with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. And economic cooperation among ASEAN +3 (ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan) has been closed to U.S. participation. China, South Korea and Japan are also considering a trilateral FTA. These agreements divert trade from the United States and the absence of U.S. participation in developing these trade rules **undermines American leadership in the region**. Recent U.S. membership in the East Asian Summit (ASEAN+3, Australia, New Zealand, India and Russia) should go some way toward addressing this problem, but the U.S. has so far not pursued economic integration in the EAS. In this light, the TPP will be an important vehicle for the U.S. to pursue economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Completing the TPP will be an economic complement to President Obama’s declaration of a U.S. strategic “pivot” toward Asia.[12] It will build on the Korea-U.S. FTA which came into effect on March 15, 2012. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently, “One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region."[13]

**Manufacturing capabilities key to technology necessary for U.S. deterrence**

O’Hanlon et al 12 (Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa, Haffa Defense Consulting Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W. Singer, The Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy January 2012,” pg online @ <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon> //um-ef)

The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as **the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past**. Defense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts. **But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security resonance**. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era—**not only for winning wars but for deterring them**. **That requires world-class** scientific and **manufacturing capabilities—**which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.

**Defense industrial base deters war with Russia**

Watts 2008 (Senior Fellow @ The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Barry D, “The US Defense Industrial Base, Past, Present and Future,” CBA, \_\_http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015.\_The\_US\_Defense\_In/R.20081015.\_The\_US\_Defense\_In.pdf\_\_)

Since the 1950s, the US defense industrial base has been a source of long-term strategic advantage for the United States, just as it was during World War II. **American defense companies provided the bombers and missiles on which nuclear deterrence rested and armed the US military with world-class weapons, including low-observable aircraft, wide-area surveillance and targeting sensors, and reliable guided munitions cheap enough to be employed in large numbers**. They also contributed to the development of modern digital computers, successfully orbited the first reconnaissance satellites, put a man on the moon in less than a decade, and played a pivotal role in developing the worldwide web. Critics have long emphasized President Eisenhower’s warning in his farewell television address that the nation needed to “guard against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.” Usually forgotten or ignored has been an earlier, equally important, passage in Eisenhower’s January 1961 speech: A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. **Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction**. Eisenhower’s warning about undue influence, rather than the need to maintain American military strength, tends to dominate contemporary discussions of the US defense industrial base. While the percentage of US gross domestic product going to national defense remains low compared to the 1950s and 1960s, there is a growing list of defense programs that have experienced problems with cost, schedule, and, in a few cases, weapon performance. In fairness, the federal government, including the Department of Defense and Congress, is at least as much to blame for many of these programmatic difficulties as US defense firms. Nevertheless, those critical of the defense industry tend to concentrate on these acquisition shortcomings. The main focus of this report is on a larger question. How prepared is the US defense industrial base to meet the needs of the US military Services in coming decades? The Cold War challenge of Soviet power has largely ebbed, but new challenges have emerged. There is the immediate threat of the violence stemming from SalafiTakfiri and Khomeinist terrorist groups and their state sponsors, that have consumed so much American blood and treasure in Iraq; the longer-term challenge of authoritarian capitalist regimes epitomized by the rise of China and a resurgent Russia; and, not least, the worsening problem of proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons. In the face of these more complex and varied challenges, it would surely be premature to begin dismantling the US defense industry. From a competitive perspective, therefore, the vital question about the defense industrial base is whether it will be as much a source of long-term advantage in the decades ahead as it has been since the 1950s.

**US-Russia war causes extinction**

**Bostrom, 2002**

[Nick, Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html]

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

**Second is relations**

**China’s entrance solves US-Sino relations**

**Gross 7/9/13** - Senior Associate at the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), is a former White House and State Department official (Donald, “Welcoming China to the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” The Huffington Post, 7/9/13, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/trans-pacific-partnership-china\_b\_3562801.html)//AC](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/donald-gross/trans-pacific-partnership-china_b_3562801.html%29//AC)

When senior officials from the United States and China meet this week in Washington for a new round of their Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the U.S. has an excellent opportunity to overcome a deeply divisive economic issue complicating relations with Beijing by welcoming China's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). At the time President Obama declared his strong support for creating this new Asia Pacific trade bloc in November 2011, the administration envisioned it as a way of countering China's economic rise as part of the U.S. "pivot to Asia." Obama and U.S. officials coupled their advocacy of the TPP with a warning that the U.S. was "growing increasingly impatient and frustrated with...Chinese economic policy and the evolution of the U.S.-China economic relationship." They called on China to "play by the rules" and criticized it for "gaming the system." In the words of David Pilling, a leading columnist for the Financial Times, the U.S. vision for the TPP amounted to an "anyone-but-China club" which had the "unstated aim" of creating a trade area "that excludes the world's second biggest economy." As a "comprehensive high-level agreement" among the 12 countries now in negotiations, the TPP would cover about 40 percent of global output and about one-third of world trade. Not surprisingly, many Chinese commentators initially saw the TPP as an instrument for containing China. Beijing reacted to the U.S. announcement in the fall of 2011 by accelerating its own efforts to build a new free trade pact called the "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership" among the 10 ASEAN countries plus five countries that have current free trade agreements with ASEAN -- South Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand. China also pushed ahead on negotiations to reach a trilateral trade agreement with Japan and South Korea as well as a bilateral agreement with Seoul. The risk of the United States and China moving toward competitive Asian trade blocs peaked in March 2013, when the U.S. persuaded Japan to join the TPP negotiations at a time of mounting conflict with China over disputed island territories in the East China Sea. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared that joining the TPP would strengthen Japan's "security" and emphasized the shared "values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights and the rule of law" among TPP members. Abe failed to mention that the U.S. previously invited Vietnam and Malaysia to join the TPP negotiations, though their governments infringe human rights and curtail democracy as well as rely heavily on the state subsidies, controlled prices and state-owned enterprises that are antithetical to the purposes of the new trade agreement. In late May, during the run-up to the summit between President Obama and President Xi Jinping, China broke the vicious cycle leading toward separate Asian trade blocs when the Ministry of Commerce announced it would study whether to participate in the TPP negotiations. According to the Ministry, China "will analyze the pros and cons as well as the possibility of joining the TPP, based on careful research and according to principles of equality and mutual benefit. And we also hope to exchange information and materials with TPP members on the negotiations." China's recently declared interest in the TPP reflects its desire to improve relations with the United States, reduce government involvement in the private sector and help shape the rules of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. If China seeks membership in the TPP after the regional free trade agreement is completed, it would have to accept all the terms that were previously negotiated. By inviting China to join the negotiations for the TPP at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the United States would strengthen the likelihood of the U.S. benefiting both from China's long-term economic growth and its support for international institutions on which the U.S. relies. As Professor John Ikenberry of Princeton University puts it:The "United States cannot thwart China's rise, but it can help ensure that China's power is exercised within the rules and institutions that the United States and its partners have crafted ... that can protect the interests of all states in the more crowded world of the future." Most importantly, including China in the TPP would advance crucial objectives of American economic policy -- obtaining greater access to the Chinese market for U.S. goods and services, significantly reducing the Chinese government's role in the private sector, protecting intellectual property, and fostering greater foreign investment in both China and the United States. This week's Strategic and Economic Dialogue is an opportune time to make it manifestly clear the United States welcomes Beijing's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and, in so doing, resolve an issue that has hurt U.S. relations with China for far too long.

**Including China in the TPP negotiations is key to an *effective* relationship – current strategy makes China form stronger ties with Asian countries, reducing Chinese and US influence in the region to a zero-sum game**

**Xinbo ’12** – Professor and Deputy Director, the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai (Wu, “Not Backing Down: China Responds to the US Rebalance to Asia,” December 2012, Global Asia: A Journal of the East Asia Foundation, <http://globalasia.org/l.php?c=e537)//ER>

Power, Influence and the Future In response to the US application of more diplomatic, security and economic resources to Southeast Asia, in part to undermine China’s growing influence, China has stepped up efforts to strengthen ties with ASEAN countries, especially Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Such efforts include offering economic assistance, engaging in economic, military and security co-operation, stepping up diplomatic contacts and promoting cultural exchanges. To some extent, it was the US pivot that caused China to give even higher priority and devote more resources to the region. To be sure, an important element of the US rebalance strategy is to strengthen its military presence in the Western Pacific in order to cope with China’s growing military power and expanded naval activities in the region. China has responded by continuing to develop its “area-denial” and “anti-access” capabilities, so as to maintain a reliable deterrent against US forces within the so-called first island chain, which stretches from the Kuril Islands in the north to the Malay Peninsula in Southeast Asia, mostly as a contingency in the event of conflict over Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese Navy is dispatching its ships more frequently in the area, extending the parameters of its operations and power projection capabilities. Obviously, the Obama administration’s Asia pivot has brought more geopolitical and security pressure on China and intensified the competition between Beijing and Washington in the region. It has also encouraged other countries to assert their claims in territorial and maritime disputes with China, leading to more tensions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea over the past several years. Should the Obama administration in its second term continue to pursue an Asia strategy aimed at counterbalancing China’s rising power and influence, a heightening of Sino-US competition and regional instability will be inevitable. Given the changing regional circumstances, a US Asia strategy focusing on countering a rising China is neither sustainable nor feasible. A wiser US strategy should be based on the following: First, as China continues to pursue a peaceful rise and becomes more interdependent with the rest of the region, including the US, Washington should not view China’s growing power and influence as a challenge or threat to its interests, but rather as a positive force for regional stability and prosperity. Second, almost all countries in the region prefer to live harmoniously with both China and the US; even though some may rely more on China economically and the US militarily, they don’t want to choose sides between the two giants. Finally, if the US can work with a rising China to develop a pattern of interactions in regional affairs marked by shared power and responsibility, it will help prevent their relations slipping into a zero-sum game, thus better serving US interests in Asia in the long run.

**Relations solve inevitable US-China conflict and arms race**

**Roy 12** - senior United States diplomat specializing in Asian affairs, three-time ambassador, Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., Chairman of the Hopkins-Nanjing Advisory Council (J. Stapleton, “DEALING WITH A RISING CHINA,” The Wilson Center, November 2012, [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/policy\_brief\_dealing\_with\_a\_rising\_china.pdf)//AC](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/policy_brief_dealing_with_a_rising_china.pdf%29//AC)

The Policy Context: Sustainable U.S. Engagement with East Asia The United States and China are both in the process of selecting the leaders who will guide their respective countries for the next few years. These leaders will face a host of daunting domestic and foreign issues that will demand their attention. None is more important than the task of finding ways to block the current drift of U.S.-China relations toward strategic rivalry. If both countries do not properly address this drift, it will become more difficult, perhaps dangerously so, to preserve the climate of peace and prosperity that has fostered China’s rise and made East Asia such a dramatic success story. The U.S. strategy of rebalancing in East Asia, as reflected in increased U.S. attention to the region, particularly Southeast Asia, is part of a coherent U.S. policy approach. The policy does not seek to contain China but hopes to restore the region’s confidence that the United States, despite its budget difficulties, is committed to maintaining a robust regional presence. With the conspicuous exception of China, this approach has been broadly welcomed in East Asia, although not without underlying concerns. China’s more assertive behavior following the 2008 financial crisis increased neighboring countries’ desire for the United States to continue to play a balancing role. However, these same countries worry that the United States may go too far in provoking China by trumpeting U.S. determination to pivot back into East Asia and to reassert a leadership role. In addition, America’s closest friends and allies in the region share the concern that the United States, distracted by its domestic difficulties, will lack the staying power to remain fully engaged in East Asia. This ambivalence underscores the fact that the credibility of U.S. policy in East Asia rests to a significant degree on the perception in Asian capitals of how effectively Washington is managing its relations with Beijing. East Asians want the United States sufficiently engaged to deter China from using its growing military capabilities in inappropriate ways. At the same time, they do not want the United States to rely excessively on the military component of its regional presence, which could have an undesired polarizing effect. Above all, these countries fear that unconstrained U.S.-China competition could make China a more dangerous neighbor and increase pressures on them to choose between China and the United States, a choice they do not want to make. These considerations underline the importance of using measured rhetoric in defining U.S. regional policy. In contrast to the Cold War era, countries in East Asia are seeking a sustainable U.S. political, economic, and military presence in the region. They do not want a robust affirmation of U.S. leadership, which would highlight regional rivalry between China and the United States. Washington also should show respect for the concept of centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and not appear to challenge the leading role played by the ASEAN countries in creating a new regional architecture over the past decade and a half. The Policy challenge: creaTing a new TyPe of bilaTeral greaT Power relaTionShiP wiTh china The U.S. rebalancing strategy does not address the principal challenge in managing U.S. relations with a rapidly rising China: how to deal with the destructive dynamic created when a rising power contests the positions of an established power. The governments of both China and the United States are aware of the lessons from history on this question and are determined not to let history repeat itself. On a number of public occasions in 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has spoken of the need to find a new answer to the ancient question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet. As she put it, “The United States is attempting to work with a rising power to foster its rise as an active contributor to global security, stability, and prosperity while also sustaining and securing American leadership in a changing world.” She added that “We are trying to do this without entering into unhealthy competition, rivalry, or conflict.” In her view, China and the United States “are, together, building a model in which we strike a stable and mutually acceptable balance between cooperation and competition.” This new circumstance, in her words, requires “adjustments in our thinking and in our actions on both sides of the Pacific.”1 The United States is not the only country that is talking in this fashion. China’s top foreign policy official, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, has spoken in very similar terms. He has emphasized the imperative of building a new type of China-U.S. relationship so that the two countries can break what he called the “iron-clad law” of history that dooms established powers and rising powers to “go to war, hot or cold alike.” He has also acknowledged that this new type of relationship should balance competition and cooperation. In his words, it “is impossible for China and the United States not to have any competition. But such competition should be healthy and galvanizing to each other. It should be understood in the context of cooperation.” Both countries, in short, have defined a common goal of creating a new type of relationship that strikes a balance between cooperation and competition. If they fail in this endeavor, they will be hard put to steer clear of the dangerous precedents of the past**.** The STraTegic Problem This need to strike a balance between cooperation and competition is the heart of the strategic problem. Both Washington and Beijing consider good bilateral relations to be vital. But their growing strategic rivalry has the potential to evolve into mutual antagonism. A stronger China will undoubtedly see itself as again becoming the central player in East Asia. The United States, for its part, has long been a Pacific power with formal alliances and strategic ties throughout the region. As successive U.S. presidents have made clear—including, most recently, President Barack Obama during his November 2011 visit to the region—the United States intends to remain actively engaged in East Asia. The question for the leaders of both countries is whether they can find a solution to this conundrum that lies at the heart of the bilateral ties between Washington and Beijing. This solution will be the key to building the new type of U.S.-China relationship that top leaders on both sides see as necessary to avoid a drift toward confrontation. Where do we stand in this process? The answer is that both China and the United States have a discrepancy between their respective defense responses and declared strategic goal of preventing a drift toward confrontation in the U.S.-China relationship. This condition undermines the coherence of the overall strategy. The Chinese approach is based on developing what the Chinese call counterintervention capabilities, which are aimed at sharply increasing the risks for U.S. forces operating in a hostile environment in areas adjacent to Chinese territory. The U.S. term for this emerging People’s Liberation Army capability is anti-access/area denial. The U.S. Defense Department is responding with a concept jointly developed by the U.S. Air Force and Navy called Air Sea Battle. Because the concept is based on attacking capabilities on the China mainland, it is essentially a formula that could quickly escalate to all-out war. Even if conflict on this scale is unlikely and preventable, this action-reaction process holds the potential for what one writer has called a “military capabilities competition” of unlimited duration. Such a competition not only has serious budgetary implications but also is certain to increase mutual mistrust between Washington and Beijing. In other words, Chinese and U.S. actions and their declared strategic goals do not yet conform with each other. A complicating factor is that despite the commitment of leaders in Washington and Beijing to the goal of developing a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive bilateral relationship, public opinion in both countries is divided on the question of whether the other is a friend or a potential adversary. Meanwhile, both countries’ military establishments are busy preparing for worst-case scenarios. Failure to address this problem forthrightly will make it more difficult to manage. Clearly, active measures are needed by leaders in Washington and Beijing to address the trust deficit between the two countries that contributes to the drift toward confrontation. Giving high priority to this strategic challenge will make other bilateral problems easier to manage. This challenge will be the critical test of leaders in both countries.

**Extinction**

**Straight Times 2k** (Ching Cheong, Senior Writer at the Strait Times, “No one gains in a war over Taiwan,” June 25th, Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore**.** If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability**,** there is little hope of winning a war against China, 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.

# Plan

**The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement toward Mexico through multilateral trade negotiations.**

# Solvency

**The TPP is inevitable and its free trade policies solve global stability better than protectionism**

**Yan 7/24/13** – Staff Writer for the Malaysian Insider (Tay Tian, “The philosophy of half-filled glass,” The Malaysian Insider, 7/24/13, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/the-philosophy-of-half-filled-glass-tay-tian-yan)//AC

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) doesn’t seem to have much to do with people in the street, but its influences could be far beyond what most would imagine. Some experts are of the opinion that this TPP is going to be the most vital regional talk in process, and could be the most important trend for global trade. Under the TPP Agreement, countries encircling the Pacific Ocean will be forming a free trade bloc where zero tariff will be implemented among member states within ten years. So far countries that are participating in the TPP talks include the Unite States, Mexico, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Vietnam and Brunei. Japan is expected to join in the talks within days. Malaysia is also a part of this TPP framework and the latest round of talks is currently held in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. The importance of TPP lies in the fact that member countries will have to open up their markets and dismantle any tariff obstacles. This means that the marketplace will be expanded and billions of dollars worth of business opportunities await. It is preliminarily estimated that the TPP will make up about 35% of global total trade. That said, TPP also brings on stiffer competition as various protective measures will not have a place under the TPP framework. Companies from all member states will have to compete among themselves on the same platform. For instance, Malaysia will have to open up its automobile market, and our national car makers are expected to lose their current competitive edge in the country. Mega projects and protected sectors such as finance, legal services, telecommunication will all have to brace for foreign competition. Foreign goods and services will gain easier access into Malaysian market. In a similar manner, Malaysians products will also stand better chances of penetrating foreign markets, and this is expected to boost our industrial development while exploring new trade growths. Of course, a prerequisite is that we must have the competitiveness. So, is this TPP a boon or bane to local businesses? Well, it is like a half-filled glass whereby someone would say another half glass of water could be added while others lament that the glass is only half filled. Among the opponents, the Malay Chamber of Commerce and the Muslim Consumer Association of Malaysia have already applied pressure on the government, mainly because they are worried new rivals will also vie for the government’s mega projects. Meanwhile, the private sector players are also equally concerned. They are worried an opened market would unfavourably impact the domestic market, especially the SMEs. While there are justifications for the opposing voices, the **opponents have largely based their arguments upon the foundation of protectionism.** The problem is, we are an open economy with a very large trade ratio. This, coupled with our relatively small domestic market, makes it hard for our economy to be propelled by domestic demands alone. **If we were to try to insulate ourselves in our own protective shell, we will sooner or later find ourselves unable to survive in this globalised world. On the contrary, if we tone up our competitiveness and courageously brace the external challenges, vast business opportunities are waiting for us.** Moreover, our reforms can only be effectively implemented if we join the global competition in the place of protective measures, and rectify the various inequitable policies such as the bumiputra privileges. This is yet another opportunity that TPP may promise this country.

**US-Mexico cooperation in the TPP solves further integration and North American competition**

**Heymann et al 12** - James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former Deputy Attorney General (Phil, “A Stronger Future: Policy Recommendations for U.S.-Mexico Relations,” The Wilson Center & The Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands, March 2012, http://sunnylands.org/files/pages/151/stronger\_f.pdf)//AC

Cooperation on Global Issues and Foreign Policy For the United States, Mexico is a key partner in international affairs. Mexico works hard to protect the United States from terrorist threats and to weaken transnational organized crime groups. It is a middle income country, currently holds the presidency of the G-20, and is expected to grow steadily for many years to come. Jim O’Neil of Goldman Sachs, for example, expects Mexico to have the seventh largest economy in the world by 2020. Mexico has long served as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds, and the U.S. can take advantage of this fact by working closely with Mexico on issues of common interest. Mexico, too, has much to gain from working in partnership with the United States. Despite significant success in its role as host of the recent United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico has punched below its weight on foreign policy for several years. To increase international clout, Mexico must become even more active in international institutions, perhaps getting involved in UN peacekeeping operations, among other things. Mexico has an opportunity to reclaim its role as a regional leader by working with other hemispheric partners to help Central America fight transnational organized crime and strengthen the rule of law. The United States, with its strong capabilities and weighty voice, should support Mexico’s desire to take on more leadership on the regional and global stages. Policy Option: Mexico and the United States could work together to restore the vitality of the Organization of American States, a struggling but critically important regional institution. Such a foreign policy partnership does not mean that Mexico must adopt U.S. positions; it just entails recognition that on many issues the countries have shared interests and objectives. A more active support of mutual goals, such as the consolidation of democracy in the Americas, could benefit both nations. The best forum for joint regional efforts may often be the Organization of American States. Policy Option: Mexico and Canada have each joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, and the United States should work closely with its North American partners as negotiations proceed. Mexico, the United States, and Canada have each begun to reorient their foreign policy to focus more attention on the Asia-Pacific region. The question now is whether they will pivot individually or do so as members of a North American strategic and economic partnership. In efforts to strengthen relationships with nations throughout Asia, grow trade, or push nations to respect their WTO obligations, the countries of North America are more competitive and convincing when working together. North American cooperation brings together three distinct and important voices: Canada, the consummate multilateralist; Mexico, a large and important growth market; and the United States, still the world’s top superpower. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an obvious place to begin to articulate and enact such a stance. The TPP has the potential to strengthen North America’s own integration while taking steps forward toward the strategic goals of both the United States and Mexico.

**Effective Mexican participation in the TPP is key to US-Mexico and Asia-Mexico trade**

**SE ’13** (SECRETARÍA DE ECONOMÍA, “Mexico Invited to Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations,” 2013, News and Events, [http://www.economia.gob.mx/news-and-events/press-room/headlines/8214-boletin-136-12en)//ER](http://www.economia.gob.mx/news-and-events/press-room/headlines/8214-boletin-136-12en%29//ER)

“The strategic value of belonging to the TPP lies in leveraging Mexico's role as a relevant player in global supply chains, both for the US market and in Asia-Pacific, the most dynamic region in the world," said Secretary Bruno Ferrari.¶ Mexico's participation in the TPP negotiations will contribute to the goal of creating a 21st Century agreement which will drive growth and economic development and promote innovation, benefitting our consumers and supporting the generation and retention of jobs, raising living standards and reducing poverty in participating countries and in the Asia-Pacific region.¶ The importance of the TPP for Mexico can be seen from two great dimensions: North America and Asia. In the case of North America, due to the strategic economic relations between Mexico and the United States, the TPP will enable synergies to be further strengthened and the natural integration of our exports deepened, as well as create greater trade opportunities and better jobs. In the case of Asia, Mexico has proven to be a fundamental factor for the economic integration of a good part of the region through its participation in supply chains.¶ Entry to the TPP gives Mexico a great opportunity to continue to diversify its exports and markets to regions with highly dynamic economies. Asia has become the most dynamic region for Mexican exports. In the last six years the average growth of Mexico's exports to Asia has surpassed 20%, primarily to countries with which it has diversified trade, such as Australia, New Zealand and Vietnam.¶ The TPP is currently the most important plurilateral trade negotiation because of its wide range of products and disciplines and economic importance. There are now 9 negotiating members: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam, which in 2011 represented 18% of world imports, 15% of exports and almost one third (26%) of the GDP.¶ Mexico will actively participate in the TPP negotiation process once the internal legal procedures for the incorporation of new members to the trade initiative have been concluded.¶ Mexico's total trade with the nine TPP members reached US$466 billion in 2011. Mexican exports reported US$280 billion. In the same year, Mexican imports were reported at US$186 billion.¶ Mexico continues to embark on negotiations with other nations to establish trade ties with conditions of reciprocity which offer maximum benefits to the manufacturing sector and domestic consumers.

**US lead role is key**

**Lewis 11 –** Meredith Kolsky Lewis received her BA from Northwestern University and her J.D. and MSFS degrees from Georgetown University. Prior to entering academia she praacticed international trade and litigation in the Washington, DC and Tokyo offices of Shearman & Sterling LLP. Lewis’s research focuses on international economic law, with a particular emphasis on international trade law and the World Trade Organization. She teaches public and private international law subjects, including International Trade Law and International Business Transactions. She is also Director of the Canada-United States Legal Studies Centre, (“The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or

Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?”, 1-1-2011, <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1264&context=iclr)//sawyer>

An expanded TPP could lead to a different path toward Asian economic integration, which would have neither ASEAN nor the three anoints or an East Asian FTA. In particular, an expanded TPP ou inserting itself into what is likely to be the more powerful f tw Depending on how the expansion is structured, the TPP additionally has the potential to multilateralize some aspects of regionalism,66 m r East Asian economies as its driver, and which would instead have the United States as a central participant.64 If the expanded TPP becomes the basis for a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), Asian integration will likely develop along lines more similar to those envisioned (even if primarily in an aspirational sense) by the members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) than those being contemplated in the context of ASEAN-plus arrangeme w ld lead to a trans-Pacific integration rather than an intra-Asian integration. The United States’ decision to negotiate to join the TPP is therefore quite savvy. By joining the TPP, the United States has the potential not only to thwart efforts to shape Asian economic regionalism models that exclude it, but, if the TPP expansion is successful and continues, the United States will also be a leader and agenda-setter with respect to the parameters of a future FTAAP. Further, if the TPP grows into an FTAAP, the global economic order would also be altered. At present there are three major economic blocs—the Americas, Europe, and Asia—and the American bloc is not necessarily the most economically powerful among these.65 An Asia-Pacific integration has the potential to alter the balance into a two-bloc model comprising Europe and the Asia-Pacific, with the latter including Asia, the United States, Oceania, and much of South America. Therefore, joining the TPP could help the United States play an active role in altering the regional power balance, thereby o o large blocs as opposed to remaining on the wrong side of a divided Pacific.

**Lack of US-Mexico trade now – Mexico is concerned that a US-EU deal will threaten their trade with the United States.**

EurActiv 13 [5/27, http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/eu-trans-atlantic-deal-seen-conc-news-520010]

Mexico, which sees itself as a privileged US partner, is concerned about the possible consequences of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Spanish MEP Ricardo Cortés Lastra told EurActiv in an interview.¶ Cortés Lastra, who is the author of the report on the basis of which the European Parliament Resolution “On defining a new development cooperation policy with Latin America” was adopted in June 2012, shared his impression from his recent visit to Mexico, where he held talks with his counterparts.¶ The Sociliast and Democrat MEP said that his Mexican colleagues were worried that the EU-US trade deal could have as a result that the EU would become a more important to the US at the expense of Mexico.¶ “Logically Mexico, which has the US as great business partner and has a little diversified market, watches with some concern what kind of consequence these agreements might have,” he said.¶ The ideas expressed by Cortés Lastra reflect the state of mind reported in other developing countries, especially in Africa. Both the EU and the US give trade preferences to some African nations, but their benefit schemes differ. Therefore the expected policy harmonisation is raises the question on the negative consequences for some of the countries.